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ABSTRACT
It has been hypothesized that humans have evolved a hypersensitivity to
detect intentional agents at a perceptual level, as failing to detect these
agents may potentially be more harmful than incorrectly assuming that
agents are absent. Following this logic, ambiguous threatening
situations should lead people to falsely detect the presence of agents. In
six threat-inducing experiments (N = 233) we have investigated whether
threat induction increases agent detection. We operationalized human
agent detection by means of a Biological Motion Detection Task
(Experiments 1 and 2) and an Auditory Agent Detection Task
(Experiment 4). Intentionality detection was operationalized by means of
a Geometrical Figures Task (Experiment 3). Threat manipulations that
were either weak (threatening pictures, classical horror music) or
moderate (virtual reality) did not increase false human agent or
intentionality detection. Moreover, participants generally had a response
bias towards assuming that agents were absent (Experiments 1a, 1b, 2a,
2b, and 4). Further, agent and intentionality detection measures were
unrelated to individual differences in supernatural beliefs, although they
were related to the negativity bias. This study reveals the boundary
conditions under which the agent and intentionality detection is not
intensified and provides recommendations for future research.
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1. Introduction
A common feature shared across many supernatural beliefs is the belief in supernatural agents (e.g.,
souls, spirits, gods; Pyysiainen, 2009). By belief in the supernatural (Latin: supranaturalis), we refer
to all of the entities or events entailed by those beliefs that supposedly exist beyond (supra) nature
(naturalis). They are culturally specific, unverifiable beliefs about non-physical phenomena that do
not coincide with a naturalistic worldview, and are therefore invisible, intangible, and immeasur-
able.1 Scholars within the cognitive science of religion (i.e., the research niche that investigates the
[neuro-]cognitive foundations of supernatural beliefs; e.g., Xygalatas, 2014) have proposed that belief
in supernatural agents may have its basis in evolved cognitive biases (Barrett, 2000; Barrett & Bur-
dett, 2011; Guthrie, 1993; Johnson, 2009; and for a review of biases, see Norenzayan & Gervais,
2013). One of these biases that has generated a considerable amount of research interest is the
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hypersensitive agency detection device (HADD; e.g., Barrett, 2000, 2012; Barrett & Lanman, 2008;
Bertolotti & Magnani, 2010; Bloom, 2007; Green, 2015; McKay & Whitehouse, 2015; Nieuwboer,
van Schie, & Wigboldus, 2015; Nola, 2014; Norenzayan, Hansen, & Cady, 2008; Petrican & Burris,
2012; Riekki, Lindeman, & Raij, 2014; van Elk, 2013; van Elk, Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld,
2016) – a hair-triggering device that responds over-actively to ambiguous information that could
potentially signal the presence of other agents such as other humans or animals (Barrett, 2000; Bar-
rett & Burdett, 2011). For instance, the sound of a branch breaking in a dark forest could potentially
trigger the HADD, causing the false perception of an agent.
The HADD can be considered a specific instance of error management theory (Johnson, 2009;
Nola, 2014), which is an attempt to explain biases from an evolutionary perspective (Haselton & Net-
tle, 2006; Johnson, Blumstein, Fowler, & Haselton, 2013). This theory builds on the logic of Pascal’s
Wager argument in which people should logically live their lives as if God exists. Pascal argued that
the potential costs are much greater if you live a Godless life and God exists (i.e., you might end up in
hell) than if you live a moral life and God does not exist. In addition, error management builds on
signal detection principles (Green & Swets, 1966). The main idea is that strongly biased systems have
higher fitness than weakly biased ones, especially if there is an imbalance between the costs and
benefits of specific decisions. For instance, when decisions have to be made regarding the presence
or absence of a possible agent, two possible errors can occur: a false alarm (i.e., false agent detection
when an agent is absent) and a false negative (i.e., failure to detect an agent that is present). Usually
the costs of these two errors are asymmetrical and over many years of natural selection a bias for the
least costly error has developed (Guthrie, 1993; Guthrie et al., 1980; Haselton & Nettle, 2006). In case
of the HADD, failing to detect the presence of another agent in a threatening situation (e.g., a dark
and scary forest) is often more costly (e.g., an agent can kill you) than incorrectly assuming the pres-
ence of another agent for which the potential costs are relatively small (e.g., you waste energy).
Crucially for the present study, although it could be argued that threat is not necessary for eliciting
agent detection (e.g., people believing that agents are behind crop circles), threat is central to HADD
reasoning for two other reasons. First, it has been predicted that threat intensifies the hypersensitivity
of the HADD (Barrett, 2010), i.e., more false positives are expected in potentially threatening situ-
ations. Second, the evolution of the HADD is typically explained in terms of error management prin-
ciples (Barrett, 2000; Barrett & Lanman, 2008; Guthrie, 2002; Johnson, 2009; Nola, 2014), favoring a
bias to the least costly error in ambiguous threatening situations. Accordingly, an important first step
towards assessing the validity of an evolutionary account of agent detection biases would be to inves-
tigate whether humans become more biased towards detecting agents in ambiguous potentially
threatening situations. In the present study, we used weak to moderate threat-eliciting manipulations
to investigate whether they would invoke the false perception of human agents and intentionality.
1.1. From agent detection to supernatural beliefs
An influential theory within the cognitive science of religion is that the false alarms generated by the
HADD in threatening situations encourage belief in supernatural agents. Thus, belief in supernatural
agents is seen as a by-product of the HADD (although this is just one contributing factor of many
cognitive mechanisms that may lead to the evolution of supernatural beliefs). The foundations of this
hypothesis can be traced back to Guthrie et al.’s anthropomorphism account of religion (1980;
Guthrie, 1993, 1997, 2007). Guthrie suggested that due to the central importance of humans in
our lives, we take the human model as a default, and consequently we easily incorrectly infer the
presence of humanness (i.e., humans, human minds, and human language). For example, thousands
of years ago when thunder struck, people attributed this to an angry, supernatural, human-like agent
(e.g., Wodan, Zeus, and Indra, all gods of thunder).
Building on ideas of Guthrie (1993) and Darwin (1871), Barrett (2000) argued that this propensity
for inferring the presence of other humans also applies to inferring other intentional agents more
generally (i.e., all agents with self-propelled, purposeful, and goal-directed behavior). The underlying
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reasoning was that a general agent detection system could have evolved to detect the presence of
other organisms (predator and prey), conferring great increases to the survival chances of early
hominids (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2008; Barrett & Burdett, 2011). Due to the apparent
ease (i.e., hypersensitivity) with which agents are detected in ambiguous situations, it was termed the
HADD (Barrett, 2000; Barrett & Burdett, 2011; Barrett & Lanman, 2008). Important to note is that
Barrett (2000) first proposed an “agent” detection device, which was later changed to an “agency”
detection device (Barrett, 2004) to account for the intentional aspect of agents. According to Barrett
(2008), attributing intentions to agents involves two mutually reinforcing steps. In the first step,
people’s HADDmerely detects the presence of agents. In the second step, people’s mentalizing capa-
bilities (i.e., theory of mind) cause them to attribute beliefs and desires to these agents. Thus, the
HADD may be a necessary but insufficient contributing factor in explaining belief in supernatural
agents; it merely encourages these beliefs. Mentalizing and other cognitive mechanisms may be
additional important mechanisms that enable belief in supernatural agents. Nevertheless, HADD
reasoning predicts that in threatening or ambiguous situations, the HADD will detect intentional
agents’ presence with little apparent evidence (Barrett, 2010).
Further clarification on how a HADD may encourage supernatural beliefs was proposed by Lis-
dorf (2007; building on earlier work by Bacon, Spinoza, Hume, and Dennett), who suggested that it
is not the perceptual detection of physical intentional agents that encourages humans to believe
in supernatural agents. Instead, supernatural beliefs are encouraged due to our sensitivity for
inferring intentionality in physical entities (i.e., a hypersensitive intentionality detection device).
This has been termed the “intentional stance” (Dennett, 1987). For instance, Dennett (2006) suggests
that the intentional stance leads people to sense that there is something and that something is inter-
preted as an agent. Indeed, it has been empirically supported that the human default seems to be to
judge actions as if they were intentionally caused (e.g., Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Rosset, 2008). So
accordingly, automatically inferring that the sound of a branch breaking is due to an agent occurs
because we automatically infer that the sound was caused by something with an intentional purpose,
rather than that we always perceive agents.
In sum, it has been argued that ambiguous, threatening situations may increase the false detection
of humanness (i.e., anthropomorphism; Guthrie, 1993), agents (Barrett, 2000), agency (Barrett,
2008), or intentionality (Lisdorf, 2007), which in turn encourages belief in supernatural agents.
The present study is an attempt to investigate an assumption of HADD theory that until now has
not been directly tested. Specifically, ambiguous threatening situations (e.g., a dark forest) should
lead people to automatically detect the presence of agents, because failing to detect agents could
potentially be more harmful than not detecting agents.2 Furthermore, we investigated whether
ambiguous threatening situations led to the false detection of humanness and intentionality,
which converges with the ideas of Guthrie and Lisdorf. Finally, previous suggestions (Barrett & Bur-
dett, 2011; McKay & Whitehouse, 2015) and studies (van Elk, 2013; van Elk et al., 2016) have indi-
cated that individual differences in religious and paranormal beliefs may be important moderators of
agent detection biases. Therefore, we added the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS; Tobacyk,
2004) and religiosity questions as possible covariates to the study.
1.2. Integrating threat and agent detection literature
Literature on concepts closely related to the HADD provides indirect, tentative support to the idea
that threatening situations can lead to false agent detection. It has also been shown that, with regard
to automatic responses being a result of threatening situations, adults (Chouchourelou, Matsuka,
Harber, & Shiffrar, 2006; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Windmann & Krüger, 1998), young chil-
dren (Lobue & DeLoache, 2008; LoBue & Matthews, 2014), both from rural and urban backgrounds
(Penkunas & Coss, 2013), infants (LoBue & DeLoache, 2010; Rakison & Derringer, 2008), and even
nonhuman primates (Shibasaki & Kawai, 2009) detect threat-relevant stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders,
and angry human walking figures) more quickly than threat-irrelevant stimuli in visual detection
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paradigms. With regard to human-like agent detection biases, it has been shown that people have a
universal tendency to perceive patterns (e.g., face-like stimuli) in noisy pictures or in natural objects
(e.g., seeing faces in cars or clouds) – a phenomenon that is known as pareidolia (Liu et al., 2014). It
has been found, for instance, that false face detection rates for pure white noise stimuli can be as high
as 30–40% (Gosselin & Schyns, 2003; Hansen, Thompson, Hess, & Ellemberg, 2010). Further, litera-
ture on negativity biases has shown that during an ultimatum game, participants more often believe
that other players are human agents, rather than computers, when they are confronted with negative
compared to positive outcomes (Morewedge, 2009), a finding that could be interpreted as false detec-
tion of human-like agents in potentially threatening situations. Finally, people seem to attribute
more intentionality towards threatening phenomena (e.g., volcano eruption) than towards non-
threatening phenomena (e.g., sunset; Nieuwboer et al., 2015).
All in all, the findings discussed here are in line with the idea that people have a tendency (i.e.,
response bias) towards detecting negative and threatening stimuli and human agents. Yet the ques-
tion of whether threat detection and agent detection are cognitively linked still stands. More specifi-
cally, our research will try to answer the question of whether threatening events lead people to detect
agents more readily. Literature in which negative events were related to agent detection is in accord-
ance with HADD reasoning and error management theory, suggesting that negative events can
indeed increase agent detection. For example, people are more likely to misinterpret a rope as a
snake when listening to fearful music than when listening to control music (Prinz & Seidel,
2012). It has also been shown that decreasing control, or increasing uncertainty or loneliness, can
result in increased anthropomorphism (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2008) and the false attri-
bution of human actions to inanimate objects (Barrett & Johnson, 2003; Valdesolo & Graham,
2014b). Probably the most indicative was a study in which the link between threat and agent detec-
tion was investigated (Hoskin, Hunter, & Woodruff, 2014). In this study, it was found that threat-
inducing pictures resulted in increased false alarms on a speech detection task for people scoring
high on trait anxiety. We tried to conceptually replicate and extend these findings.
1.3. Present study
Here we present the results of six behavioral experiments aimed at extending the findings on threat
and agent detection. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that a threatening manipulation activates
the HADD, which should be reflected in the false detection of human agents or intentionality in
ambiguous stimuli (see Figure 1 for an overview of all experiments). Effects of threat priming on
human agent detection were determined by using a Biological Motion Detection Task (Experiments
1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b; van Elk, 2013; van Elk et al., 2016) and an Auditory Agent Detection Task (Exper-
iment 4; Barkus, Stirling, Hopkins, McKie, & Lewis, 2007). Effects of threat priming on intentionality
detection were determined using a Geometrical Figures Task (Experiment 3; Heider & Simmel, 1944;
Riekki et al., 2014). In both the Biological Motion Detection Task and the Auditory Agent Detection
Task, participants were required to perceptually detect a human agent embedded in varying amounts
of either visual or auditory noise. By including different numbers of distractor stimuli, the levels of
visual noise and, consequently, the ambiguity of the stimuli could be systematically manipulated to
allow assessment of the boundary conditions for the false detection of agents. In the Geometrical
Figures Task, participants were required to determine whether geometrical figures were moving
intentionally or not, while the figures were moving in a mechanistic, intentional, or random fashion.
The false detection of intentionality was operationalized as the attribution of intentionality when
figures were moving randomly or mechanistically. All tasks were designed in such a way that signal
detection analysis could be used to measure the response bias towards detecting human agents or
intentionality in a systematic fashion (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999), thereby closely mirroring the
rationale of error management theory (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). We also looked at perceptual sen-
sitivity (i.e., d’), which provides an indication of how well participants are able to distinguish signal
from noise trials (i.e., agent present vs. agent absent trials).
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In the first biological motion experiments (Experiments 1a and 1b), each trial was preceded by
either a threat or control (i.e., neutral) picture – similar to the methods that have been used to
study emotional attention (Vuilleumier, 2005).3 In the next biological motion experiments (Exper-
iments 2a and 2b), as well as the Geometrical Figures Task (Experiment 3), participants were con-
textually primed with threatening non-linear music (classical horror music), which has been shown
to increase feelings of anxiety (Blumstein, Davitian, & Kaye, 2010). In the auditory agent detection
experiment (Experiment 4), we used a virtual reality horror scenario (i.e., a dark basement) to con-
textually prime threat. For all experiments, it was expected that threatening situations would activate
the HADD more strongly than control situations, which would be reflected in an increased response
bias towards detecting human agents or intentionality. With regard to the perceptual sensitivity, we
had no a priori expectations. It could be reasoned that people’s ability to discriminate agents from
white noise increases due to increased attention, or decreases due to stress. Finally, in accordance
with HADD reasoning and previous findings from our lab (van Elk, 2013), we hypothesized that
individual differences in the detection of agents or intentionality would be related to supernatural
beliefs.
2. Methods
2.1. General overview
The behavioral experiments share the same rationale in which threat priming (Experiment 1) or con-
textual (Experiments 2–4) effects on human agent detection and intentionality attribution were
investigated (see Figure 1 for a schematic overview). Each experiment started with the presentation
of practice trials to familiarize the participant with the experimental task. All experiments were pro-
grammed using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, CA, USA). At the end of the
experiment, participants completed religiosity questions and the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the different experiments. In all experiments we investigated the effects of threat manipulation on
agent detection. In Experiments 1a and 1b, threat was manipulated by presenting pictures of the international affective picture
system; in Experiments 2a, 2b (between-subjects), and 3, threat was manipulated by presenting horror music; in Experiment 4,
threat was manipulated by means of a virtual reality horror scenario. In Experiments 1 and 2, we used a Biological Motion Detection
Task as our dependent measure; in Experiment 3, we used a Geometrical Figures Task as our dependent measure; in Experiment 4,
we used an Auditory Agent Detection Task as our dependent measure.
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(RPBS; Tobacyk, 2004), and for explorative purposes, several other questionnaires were taken into
account.
2.2. Participants
To determine the sample size, a power analysis was conducted using G-Power (version 3.1.9.2; Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). We based the analysis on the effect size found in an earlier study
in which a similar paradigm was used (van Elk, 2013). Given an effect size of h2p = 0.13 (d = 0.77), an
alpha of .05, and a power of .8, the required sample size was 16 for a within-subjects design and 58 for
a between-subjects design. To ensure sufficient statistical power, we recruited at least 30 participants
for the within-subjects design and 65 for the between-subjects design. A priori, we decided to exclude
participants from analysis who pressed the same button in more than 95% of all trials in the signal
detection task. This indicated that they had not understood the task, as in the low noise condition
(i.e., trials with only a few distractor stimuli) it was relatively clear whether an agent was present
or absent. All experiments were conducted in the behavioral lab of the University of Amsterdam
and most of our participants were students. Psychology students received research credits, whereas
students from other departments received five euros for participation. The ethics committee of the
University of Amsterdam approved the experimental protocol and all participants were treated in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
3. Experiment 1: threat pictures vs. control pictures
We conducted two different studies using threatening vs. control pictures as stimuli, which were
derived from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) database. In the first experiment
(i.e., 1a), threatening pictures were selected to be more negative (mean valence rating = 3.3, SD =
0.4) than control pictures (mean valence rating = 7.4, SD = 0.4), t(9) = 14.54, p < .001 (1 = negative,
10 = positive), while these pictures were matched on their arousal ratings, t(9) = 0.20, p = .850
(mean arousal of threat pictures M = 6.65, SD = 0.59; mean arousal of neutral pictures M = 6.60,
SD = 0.66; 1 = not arousing, 10 = very arousing). In the second experiment (i.e., 1b), threatening pic-
tures were selected to be more arousing (mean arousal rating = 6.65, SD = 0.59) than control pictures
(mean arousal rating = 5.22, SD = 0.27), t(9) = 7.58, p < .001, while these pictures were matched on
their valence ratings, t(9) = 0.74, p = .476 (mean valence of threat pictures M = 3.00, SD = 0.59;
mean valence of control pictures M = 3.31, SD = 0.84; 1 = negative, 10 = positive).
3.1. Experiment 1a
3.1.1. Methods
3.1.1.1. Participants. In total 30 participants were tested (mean age = 22.4 years; 13 females).
3.1.1.2. Experimental manipulation and paradigm. To manipulate threat, participants were primed
with pictures from the IAPS. We used two categories: threatening pictures (picture # 1120, 1050,
1300, 1726, 1321, 6260, 6230, 6300, 6510, and 2120), where examples of pictures include a snake,
lion, gun, and knife (pointing towards participant); and control pictures (picture # 5450, 8492,
8185, 8030, 8080, 5480, 8179, 8200, 8370, and 5470), where examples of pictures include a skydiver,
fireworks, a river rafter, and a bungee jumper. These pictures have been shown to be effective in
manipulating a feeling of threat in previous studies on emotional attention and cognitive processing
(e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Mogg et al., 2000; Schimmack & Derry-
berry, 2005; Van Damme, van Gallace, Spence, Crombez, & Moseley, 2009; Yiend & Mathews,
2001). To avoid carry-over effects of affective priming from one trial to the next, black and white
pictures from either category were presented in different blocks, and in total the experiment con-
sisted of four alternating blocks (ABAB or BABA; counterbalance order was counterbalanced across
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participants) of 30 trials. Each primed picture was presented for 500 ms (i.e., the prime picture was
non-subliminally presented and visible to the participant) and was followed by the presentation of a
biological motion stimulus for 2000 ms. After the biological motion stimulus, a screen was presented
that read: “Did you perceive a human agent, yes / no?” Participants had a maximum of 10,000 ms to
respond from stimulus offset. Immediately after responding, a stimulus interval was presented with a
random presentation time between 1000 and 2000 ms.
In the Biological Motion Detection Task, participants were required to judge whether a point-
light walker representing a human stick figure was present or absent in moving visual distractor
stimuli, by pressing on the left or right arrow button (this was counterbalanced across participants)
of a keyboard (this task has been used in a design by one of the authors; van Elk, 2013). The point-
light walker consisted of 12 moving white dots against a black background, representing the motion
of the joints of a human figure walking on a treadmill. The point-light walker could move in a left or
a rightwards direction and could appear at five possible horizontal locations on the screen (−10°,
−5°, 0°, 5°, 10°). In half of all stimuli, the walker was presented in an unscrambled fashion and in
the other half of all stimuli the walker was presented in a scrambled version by randomly presenting
the dots on the screen, while keeping the motion information the same. By varying the amount of
distractor points (48, 96, 192), three different levels of visual noise were created, thereby making
it more difficult to detect the presence or absence of the walker. All stimuli were generated and ren-
dered using the software package PointLightLab.4
3.1.1.3. Questionnaires
3.1.1.3.1. Religious beliefs. Religious beliefs were measured with two questions: (1) “To what extent do
you consider yourself to be religious?” (1 = not at all religious, 7 = highly religious); (2) “How often do
you visit a religious institution or meeting?” (1 = never, 7 = very frequently). The reliability was ade-
quate, Cronbach’s Alpha (α) = .93.
3.1.1.3.2. Paranormal beliefs. Belief in the paranormal was measured with the Revised Paranormal
Belief Scale (RPBS; Tobacyk, 2004). Participants had to rate the 26 items (e.g., “Reincarnation exists”)
by indicating to what extent they believed the statement was true on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The reliability was adequate, α = .89.
3.1.1.4. Procedure. Participants were told that we were investigating the effects of emotions on
motion detection. They conducted 60 trials per condition of the Biological Motion Detection
Task. Participants were instructed that they were going to see short videos in which a human
walking figure could be present or not. To ensure that participants were able to recognize the
point-light displays, a looped video was continuously shown to them at the beginning of the
study. This was displayed until they indicated that they indeed perceived a human walking figure
in the moving dots. During the experiment, each video was presented for 2 seconds, after which
the participant was required to indicate whether he or she believed that a walking human figure
was present or not by pressing the left or right button on the computer keyboard. The instruc-
tions emphasized that if uncertain, participants should trust their first impression of the stimulus
and not think too deliberately. At the end of the experiment, participants completed the ques-
tionnaire survey.
3.1.1.5. Data analysis. To analyze the Biological Motion Detection Task data, a signal detection
analysis was used (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). As a measure of response
bias, the criterion (i.e., c) was used. This represents the response strategy of the participants (i.e., say-
ing easily yes or no). It was calculated by the sum of the normalized false alarm rate and the normal-
ized hit rate, multiplying the outcome by minus 1 and subsequently dividing it by 2. A response bias
higher than 0 indicates a response bias towards not detecting agents; a response bias lower than 0
indicates a response bias towards detecting agents. As a measure of perceptual sensitivity, the differ-
ence of the z-transforms (using a normal cumulative distribution function) of the hit and false alarm
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rates was calculated for each of the different noise levels (i.e., d’ or d-prime) with MatLab (The Math-
works inc.). As discussed in Stanislaw and Todorov (1999), we added 1 to the hits, misses, false
alarms, and correct rejections to prevent Z-scores becoming infinite.
Repeated measurement analyses of variance (RM-ANOVAs; with Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted
p-values if Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated) were conducted to analyze whether the per-
ceptual sensitivity was lower and the response bias was higher in the threat condition than in the
control condition. We included the within-subjects factor noise level (48 vs. 96 vs. 192 distrac-
tors) and condition (threat manipulation vs. control manipulation). We also included the
between-subjects variable counterbalance order to investigate whether this had had a significant
influence on the results, but for conciseness, the RM-ANOVA without counterbalance order is
reported, in case the between-subjects factor was non-significant. Manipulation checks and reac-
tion times were tested with Student paired sample t-tests or Wilcoxon’s signed rank t-tests in case
significant deviations from normality were observed by means of a Shapiro-Wilk test of normal-
ity. Similar analyses were applied in all other experiments and significance levels were always set
at .05 (two-tailed).
3.1.2. Results
The mean religiosity of the participants in Experiment 1a was 2.6 (SD = 2.0; 1 = not religious at all, 7
= very religious), the mean score on the church visit question was 1.9 (SD = 1.6; 1 = never to church,
7 = very often to church), and the average score on the RPBS was 2.5 (SD = 0.9; 1 = low paranormal
belief score, 7 = high paranormal belief score). Inspection of the pattern of button presses did not
lead to exclusion of participants. Overall, during the Biological Motion Detection Task participants
responded correctly on 66.8% of all trials, suggesting that the participants were able to complete
the task above chance level. Counterbalance order neither had an effect on the response bias,
F(1,28) = 0.34, MSE = 0.53, p = .567, d = 0.22, ω² < 0.01, nor on the perceptual sensitivity, F(1,28)
= 0.31, MSE = 3.89, p = .590, d = 0.21, ω² < 0.01. Reaction times did not differ between the two
conditions (threat, M = 504.2, SD = 250.5; non-threat, M = 511.8, SD = 249.1), t(29) = 0.56, p = .579,
d = 0.10, ω² < 0.01.
The threatening pictures manipulation did not affect the response bias, F(1,29) = 0.13, MSE =
0.02, p = .717, d = 0.14, ω² < 0.01. Similarly, the noise level did not affect the response bias, F(1.56,
45.15) = 0.85, MSE = 0.17, p = .409, d = 0.34, ω² < 0.01 (see Figure 2(a), left graph). Further, the inter-
action between the threat manipulation and noise was not significant, F(1.96, 56.82) = 0.01, MSE =
0.04, p = .748, d = 0.20, ω² < 0.01, indicating that the response bias as a function of the amount of
distractors did not differ between the two conditions. The threatening pictures manipulation also
did not affect the perceptual sensitivity, F(1,29) = 0.95, MSE = 0.23, p = .337, d = 0.35, ω² < 0.01.
We did find a main effect of noise, F(1.61, 46.62) = 24.63, MSE = 0.50, p < .001, d = 1.84, ω² = 0.44,
indicating that the experiment provoked the intended result: with an increased number of distrac-
tors, the perceptual sensitivity (d’) decreased (see Figure 2(a), right graph). No significant interaction
between condition and noise level was observed, F(1.94, 56.21) = 0.37, MSE = 0.17, p = .686, d = 0.23,
ω² < 0.01, indicating that the perceptual sensitivity as a function of the amount of distractors did not
differ between the two conditions.
3.1.3. Discussion
Threatening pictures did not lead to an increased response bias to detect agents, nor did it lead to
changes in the perceptual sensitivity compared to a control condition. Interestingly, opposing
HADD theory, participants generally had a response bias towards judging that there was no agent
present in the trials. However, it could be that arousal is a necessary factor underlying the feeling
of threat, and it needs to be increased in order to observe increases on the response bias compared
to a control condition. Therefore, we repeated this experiment (i.e., Experiment 1b) but this time we
chose pictures that differed significantly on arousal but were matched on valence. We further chan-
ged the experiment in three aspects. First, we used four blocks of 30 trials instead of two blocks of 60
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trials to decrease the chance that learning effects would emerge. Second, as we failed to include a
manipulation check in the first experiment, we added two manipulation checks after each block
to investigate whether the threatening pictures manipulation elicited the desired result (i.e., increased
anxiety compared to control pictures). The first manipulation check was an anxiety measure, the
other a measure of control, as reduced feelings of control have been shown to underlie agency detec-
tion (Barrett & Johnson, 2003). Third, for explorative purposes, we added three questionnaires that
have been theoretically related to threat and agent detection in past research. The purpose and analy-
sis of these questionnaires will be outlined in detail in section 7, “Explorative analysis.”
Figure 2. (a) Response bias (left graph) and perceptual sensitivity (right graph) as a function of the number of visual distractors in
Experiment 1a. The dark lines represent the threat condition (i.e., trials preceded by threatening pictures of the IAPS) and the light
line represents the control condition (i.e., trials preceded by arousal controlled pictures of the IAPS). Error bars represent 95% con-
fidence intervals. (b) The response bias (c; left graph) and perceptual sensitivity (d’; right graph) as a function of the number of
visual distractors in Experiment 1b. The dark lines represent the threat condition (i.e., trials preceded by threat pictures of the
IAPS) and the light lines represent the control condition (i.e., trials preceded by valence controlled pictures of the IAPS). Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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3.2. Experiment 1b
3.2.1. Methods
3.2.1.1. Participants. In total, 33 participants5 were tested in Experiment 1b. One participant was
excluded, because a different experiment was started accidently, leaving 32 participants (24 females)
with a mean age of 23.3 years (SD = 5.7; range = 18–50).
3.2.1.2. Experimental manipulation and paradigm. Again, participants were primed with pictures
from the IAPS from two categories: threat pictures (picture # 1120, 1050, 1300, 1726, 1321, 6260,
6230, 6300, 6510, and 2120), where examples are a snake, lion, gun, and knife (pointing towards par-
ticipant); and valence matched control pictures (picture # 9520, 9302, 9043, 9830, 9320, 1271, 1274,
9373, 6800, and 6240), where examples are a dirty toilet, a cockroach, dirty teeth, and garbage. To
avoid carry-over effects of arousal priming from one trial to the next, black and white pictures (to
keep the colors between the conditions constant) from either category were presented in different
blocks and in total the experiment consisted of four alternating blocks (ABAB or BABA; counterba-
lance order was counterbalanced across participants). The same biological motion detection para-
digm as in Experiment 1a was used as dependent measure.
3.2.1.3. Questionnaires
3.2.1.3.1. Anxiety manipulation check.Anxiety was measured after each block with six items (e.g., “To
what extent did you feel worried during the task?”) from the Shortened Positive and Negative Affect
Scale X (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1999). One item was added (“To what extent did you feel
anxious during the task?”), to ensure that we manipulated the feeling of anxiety. Participants had
to rate the items by indicating to what extent they felt they were applicable to them on a five-
point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). The reliability was adequate, α = .95.
3.2.1.3.2. Control manipulation check. Control was measured with one question: “How much control
did you experience during the task?” (1 = none, 7 = a lot; Rutjens, Van Der Pligt, & Van Harreveld,
2010).
3.2.1.3.3. Paranormal beliefs. Paranormal beliefs were again measured with the RPBS and the
reliability was adequate, α = .97.
3.2.1.3.4. Religious beliefs. Religious beliefs were measured with four questions: “To what extent do
you consider yourself to be religious?” “To what extent do you believe in the existence of god?”
“How often do you visit a religious institution or meeting?” and “How often do you pray?” The
reliability was adequate, α = .94.
3.2.1.3.5. Anthropomorphism. The individual differences in the tendency to anthropomorphize were
measured with the Anthropomorphization Scale (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010). Participants had
to rate 14 items (e.g., “the ocean has a conscious”) by indicating the degree to which they agreed with
the statements on a nine-point scale (1 = totally disagree, 9 = totally agree). The reliability was ade-
quate, α = .93.
3.2.1.3.6. Negativity bias. The negativity bias was measured with the three-item (e.g., “I often fear for
my own safety”) Beliefs in the Dangerousness of the World Scale (Fessler, Pisor, Navarrete, &
Mesoudi, 2014; Navarrete, 2005). Participants rated each item on how applicable they felt it was
to them on a nine-point scale (1 = totally disagree, 9 = totally agree). The reliability was adequate,
α = .74.
3.2.1.3.7. Intolerance of uncertainty. Intolerance of uncertainty was measured by a short version of
the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IOU; Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007). Participants
had to rate 11 items (e.g., “I can’t stand being surprised”) by indicating the degree to which each state-
ment was applicable to them on a five-point scale (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree). The
reliability was adequate, α = .81.
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3.2.1.4. Procedure. The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1a. However, this time partici-
pants filled in manipulation checks after each of the four blocks.
3.2.1.5. Data analysis. Data analysis was conducted in a similar fashion as in Experiment 1a, using
an RM-ANOVA with the within-subjects factor noise level (48 vs. 96 vs. 192 distractors) and con-
dition (threat vs. control). Also, the between-subjects factor counterbalance order was taken into
account, to control for the possibility that the order of conditions affected the results.
3.2.2. Results
The mean religiosity of the participants in Experiment 1b was 2.1 (SD = 1.4; 1 = not religious at all, 7
= very religious) and the average score on the RPBS was 2.7 (SD = 1.4; 1 = low paranormal belief
score, 7 = high paranormal belief score). Inspection of the button presses did not lead to exclusion
of participants. Overall task performance during the Biological Motion Detection Task was 76.0%
correct, suggesting that the participants were able to complete the task above chance level. Reaction
times did not differ between the two conditions (threat M = 501.0 ms, SD = 170.5 ms; control M =
512.9 ms, SD = 173.2 ms), t(31) = 0.74, p = .462, d = 0.13, ω² < 0.01. Analysis of the manipulation
check questions indicated that participants found the threat pictures (M = 1.87, SD = 0.49) to be
equally as anxiety-provoking as the control pictures (M = 2.0, SD = 0.59; Wilcoxon’s t(31) = 96.0,
p = .126, Cohen’s d = 0.36, ω² < 0.01). This indicates that the manipulation did not elicit the desired
result. Counterbalance order did not have an effect on the results for both the response bias, F(1, 30)
= 0.13, MSE = 0.35, p = .720, d = 0.13, ω² < 0.01, and the perceptual sensitivity, F(1, 30) < 0.01, MSE
= 2.11, p = .961, d < 0.01, ω² < 0.01.
In contrast to our predictions based on hypotheses, the threatening pictures manipulation did not
affect the response bias (c), F(1, 31) = 0.04, MSE = 0.07, p = .178, d = 0.50, ω² = 0.03, indicating that
participants were not inclined to detect more agents as a result of the threat manipulation. The noise
manipulation also did not significantly affect the response bias, F(1.36, 42.26) = 3.24, MSE = 0.20, p
= .067, d = 0.64, ω² = 0.06, indicating that with increased levels of distractors, the response bias did
not increase, reflecting that participants were not inclined to detect more agents (see Figure 2(b), left
graph). Further, the interaction between the threat manipulation and noise was not significant, F
(1.94, 60.16) = 0.41, MSE = 0.07, p = .657, d = 0.23, ω² < 0.01, indicating that the response bias as a
function of the amount of distractors did not differ between the two conditions.
The threatening pictures manipulation also did not affect the perceptual sensitivity, F(1, 31) =
1.00, MSE = 0.19, p = .324, d = 0.36, ω² < 0.01. We did observe a main effect of noise, F(2, 62) =
72.17, MSE = 0.30, p < .001, d = 3.06, ω² = 0.46, indicating that the task provoked the intended result:
with an increased number of distractors, the perceptual sensitivity (d’) decreased (see Figure 2(b),
right graph). Thus, the participants found it more difficult to discriminate between agent-present
and agent-absent trials as the stimuli become more ambiguous. Also, no significant interaction
between condition and noise was observed, F(2, 62) = 0.07, MSE = 0.21, p = .933, d = 0.09, ω² <
0.01, indicating that the perceptual sensitivity as a function of the amount of distractors did not differ
between the two conditions.
3.2.3. Discussion
The two picture threat prime experiments were not very effective in eliciting threat. In Experiment
1b, our manipulation did not provoke the desired result, as the subjective anxiety ratings were com-
parable between the threat condition and the control condition. In hindsight, it may seem logical that
pictures of dirty toilets and cockroaches are equally as anxiety-provoking as pictures of guns and
snakes. We merely used this threat manipulation as it has been shown to be effective in manipulating
a mild to moderate feeling of threat in previous studies (e.g., Koster et al., 2004; Mogg et al., 2000;
Schimmack &Derryberry, 2005; Van Damme et al., 2009; Yiend &Mathews, 2001). Another point of
concern could be that the picture context may not have generalized to the Biological Motion Detec-
tion Task. Finally, a habituation effect may have emerged due to the repeated presentation of the
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images, thereby decreasing the overall anxiety level (i.e., feeling of threat) in the participants. Apart
from these limitations, it is again interesting to note that participants did not generally have a
response bias towards perceiving agents, whereas this would logically follow from a hypersensitive
device.
In the next experiment, we used a stronger threat manipulation (i.e., threatening music to induce
feelings of threat). Specifically, in Experiment 2 we presented threatening classical horror music with
non-linear sounds that have been successfully used in other studies to manipulate feelings of threat
(e.g., Blumstein et al., 2010; Prinz & Seidel, 2012). By doing so, we could continually present the
threatening context during the Biological Motion Detection Task, thereby easing the generalizability
of the manipulation to the Biological Motion Detection Task. Moreover, as the music changes at
different points in time, we also intended to decrease the chance of habituation effects. In short,
we presented a contextual threat manipulation, as this allowed us to investigate the effects of threat
while participants were conducting the human agent detection task.
4. Experiment 2: threat music vs. control music
We conducted two different studies using threatening vs. control music. In the first experiment (i.e.,
Experiment 2a), we conducted the study with a within-subjects design. In the second study (i.e.,
Experiment 2b), we conducted the study with a between-subjects design in order to prevent partici-
pants guessing the hypothesis of the study.
4.1. Experiment 2a: within-subjects
4.1.1. Methods
4.1.1.1. Participants. Thirty-one participants (21 female), with a mean age of 25.7 years (SD = 11.2,
range = 19–66), were recruited for the third experiment.
4.1.1.2. Experimental manipulation and paradigm. In order to contextually manipulate the feeling
of threat, threat-eliciting classical music (Penderecki, 2012/1960) was contrasted with neutral music
(Grieg, 1993/1875). Music was presented via headphones and care was taken so that no agents were
present in the music (e.g., voices or crying wolves). The same Biological Motion Detection Task as in
Experiment 1 was used as dependent measure.
4.1.1.3. Questionnaires, procedure, and data analysis. The questionnaires, procedure, and data
analysis were the same as in Experiment 1b.
4.1.2. Results
The mean religiosity of the participants in Experiment 2a was 2.1 (SD = 1.4; 1 = not religious at all, 7
= very religious) and the average score on the RPBS was 2.7 (SD = 1.4; 1 = low paranormal belief
score, 7 = high paranormal belief score). Inspection of the button presses did not lead to exclusion
of participants. Overall task performance during the Biological Motion Detection Task was 73.2%
correct, suggesting that the participants were able to complete the task above chance level. Reaction
times did not differ significantly between the two conditions (threat,M = 632.21 ms, SD = 286.97 ms;
control, M = 571.10 ms, SD 202.96 ms), Wilcoxon’s t = 354, p = .095, d = 0.31, ω² < 0.01. Analysis of
the manipulation check questions indicated that participants found the threatening music (M = 2.55,
SD = 0.78) to be more strongly anxiety-provoking than the control music (M = 1.87, SD = 0.43; t(31)
= 6.20, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.10, ω² = 0.27). This indicates that the manipulation provoked the
desired result, although participants did not perceive less control in the threat condition (M =
3.94, SD = 1.28) as compared to the control condition (M = 4.14, SD = 1.25), t(21) = 1.42, p = .167,
d = 0.25, ω² < .01. Counterbalance order did not have an effect on the results for the response
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bias, F(1, 30) = 0.53, MSE = 0.37, p = .471, d = 0.26, ω² < 0.01, or the perceptual sensitivity, F(1, 30) =
0.91, MSE = 1.78, p = .348, d < 0.35, ω² < 0.01.
In contrast to our predictions, the threatening music manipulation did not significantly affect the
response bias (c), F(1, 31) = 3.49, MSE = 0.31, p = .071, d = 0.67, ω² = 0.07 (see Figure 3(a), left
graph). Analysis of the response bias did not show a main effect of noise, F(1.28, 39.53) = 1.14,
MSE = 0.28, p = .306, d = 0.39, ω² < 0.01, indicating that with increased levels of distractors the
response bias did not systematically increase. Further, the interaction between the threat manipu-
lation and noise was not significant, F(2, 62) = 1.01, MSE = 0.05, p = .370, d = 0.36, ω² < 0.01, indicat-
ing that the normalized false alarm rate as a function of the amount of distractors did not differ
between the two conditions.
Figure 3. (a) The response bias (c; left graph) and perceptual sensitivity (d’; right graph) as a function of the number of visual
distractors in Experiment 2a. The dark lines represent the threat condition (i.e., classical horror music) and the light lines represent
the control condition (i.e., elevator music). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. (b) The response bias (left graph) and the
perceptual sensitivity (right graph) as a function of the number of visual distractors in Experiment 2b. The dark lines represent the
threat condition (i.e., trials run in the context of threatening music) and the light line represents the control condition (i.e., trials in
the context of neutral music). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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With regard to the perceptual sensitivity, the threatening music manipulation did not affect the
perceptual sensitivity, F(1, 31) = 0.80, MSE = 0.39, p = .379, d = 0.32, ω² < 0.01. We found a main
effect of noise, F(2, 62) = 76.79, MSE = 0.26, p < .001, d = 3.15, ω² = 0.70. This indicates that with
an increased number of distractors, the perceptual sensitivity (d’) decreased; participants found it
more difficult to discriminate agent-present from agent-absent trials (see Figure 3(a), right
graph). No significant interaction between condition and noise was observed, F(2, 62) = 1.28,
MSE = 0.20, p = .287, d = 0.40, ω² = 0.01, indicating that the perceptual sensitivity, as a function of
the amount of distractors, did not differ between the two conditions.
4.1.3. Discussion
As was evident from the manipulation checks, we were able to manipulate a somewhat stronger
threatening feeling than in the first experiments by presenting threatening horror music. However,
the manipulation did not result in significant changes in the response bias or the perceptual sensi-
tivity. Although no participants could guess the hypothesis of this experiment when asked, a within-
subjects design can affect the validity of the results due to carry-over effects between experimental
blocks (Greenwald, 1976). In the next study, we addressed this by using a between-subjects design.
4.2. Experiment 2b: between-subjects
4.2.1. Methods
4.2.1.1. Participants. Sixty-three participants (45 female), with a mean age of 22.9 years (SD = 5.3),
were recruited for the between-subjects experiment.
4.2.1.2. Experimental manipulation and paradigm. The same contextual manipulation (i.e., music)
was used as in Experiment 2a and the same Biological Motion Detection Task as in the previous
experiments was used.
4.2.1.3. Questionnaires. The specific questionnaire in this experiment differed from the question-
naires in the other experiments, because the chronological order in which the studies were conducted
was different from the order of presentation in this article.
4.2.1.3.1. Supernatural beliefs. Supernatural beliefs were measured with the supernatural belief scale
(Johnson et al., 2013). The scale consists of 10 items (e.g., “There exists an all-powerful, all-knowing,
loving God”) and had an excellent reliability, α = .96. Items were scored on a nine-point Likert scale
(1 = totally disagree, 8 = totally agree).
4.2.1.4. Data analysis. We conducted an RM-ANOVA with the three-level within-subjects factor
noise level (48 vs. 96 vs. 192 distractors) and the two-level between-subjects factor condition (horror
music vs. neutral music).
4.2.2. Results
Participants had a low average supernatural belief score of 2.46 (SD = 1.81). Five participants were
excluded from further analysis (three from the experimental condition, two from the control con-
dition) because they did not follow the instructions correctly. Of the 60 trials, they pressed 95%
or more on only one of the two buttons (i.e., they pressed three or fewer times on only one button),
which is below the predetermined criteria outlined above. No significant differences were found
regarding the reaction times (threat, M = 574.0 ms, SD = 278.2 ms; control, M = 503.1 ms, SD =
148.3 ms), t(56) = 1.22, p = .226, d = 0.32, ω² = 0.03. Overall task performance during the Biological
Motion Detection Task was 64% correct, suggesting that the participants were able to complete the
task above chance level.
With regard to the response bias, the data were not in line with our predictions. Participants who
listened to threatening music did not have a higher response bias for detecting agents than
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participants who listened to non-threatening music, F(1, 56) = 2.00, MSE = 0.35, p = .163, d = 0.38,
ω² = 0.02 (see Figure 3(b), left graph). Further, we did not observe a main effect of noise, F(2,
112) = 0.19, MSE = 0.02, p = 0.829, d = 0.11, ω² < 0.01, indicating that the response bias did not
change as a result of the number of distractors. Also, the interaction between noise and condition
was non-significant, F(2, 112) = 0.03, MSE < 0.01, p = .972, d = 0.06, ω² < 0.01, indicating that the
response bias as a function of the amount of distractors did not differ between the two conditions.
The control threat manipulation also did not affect the perceptual sensitivity, F(1, 56) = 1.48,
MSE = 1.08, p = .230, d = 0.33, ω² = 0.01. We did observe a main effect of noise, F(1.80, 100.71) =
39.88, MSE = 0.36, p < .001, d = 1.69, ω² = 0.40. This indicates that the manipulation provoked the
intended result: with an increased number of distractors, the perceptual sensitivity (d’) decreased.
Participants found it more difficult to discriminate agent-present from agent-absent trials (see Figure
3(b), right graph). Also, the interaction between noise and condition was non-significant, F(1.80,
100.71) < 0.01, MSE = 0.36, p = .993, d < 0.01, ω² < 0.01, indicating that the perceptual sensitivity
as a function of the amount of distractors did not differ between the two conditions.
4.2.3. Discussion
Again, we did not observe a significantly increased response bias towards detecting human agents
when participants were contextually primed with threatening music. Similarly, the perceptual sen-
sitivity did not change as a result of the manipulation. In all experiments conducted so far, we
used the Biological Motion Detection Task as our dependent measure. However, as indicated in
the introduction, it could be argued that the HADD does not primarily involve (human) agent detec-
tion, but rather the detection of intentions or of intentional movement. Therefore, in the next exper-
iment we investigated whether the absence of an effect in the first two studies was related to the use of
the Biological Motion Detection Task. Thus, in Experiment 3 we used another task tapping more
directly into intentionality detection (i.e., the Geometrical Figures Task) and more closely following
Lisdorf’s (2007) and Dennett’s (2006) intentionality account. We also wanted to investigate whether
participants rated the intentional movements of figures as more negative (i.e., malevolent) when
threatening music was presented. Therefore, additional measures related to the valence of the
observed movements were included.
5. Experiment 3: threatening music vs. control music
5.1. Methods
5.1.1. Participants
Forty-five participants were recruited for the study; six participants had to be excluded because they
had at least one block missing on the dependent variable due to a coding error. For one participant,
we did not have data on the questionnaires, and one of the participants did not hear the sound as the
volume was turned off. The 37 participants (20 female) included for analysis had an average age of
24.4 years (SD = 5.1, range = 18–39).
5.1.2. Experimental manipulation, questionnaires
The experimental manipulation was the same as in Experiment 2 and the questionnaires were the
same as in Experiments 1b and 2a.
5.1.3. Experimental paradigm
We operationalized perceived intentionality by means of a Geometrical Figures Task, originally
developed by Heider and Simmel (1944). We used an adapted version of the Geometrical Figures
Task developed by Riekki et al. (2014) in which videos displayed intentional, (semi-)random, or
mechanical moving geometrical figures. In the intentional movies, geometrical figures moved in
goal-directed manners (e.g., one figure was chasing another). In the (semi-)random videos, the
RELIGION, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 37
figures moved randomly but could not touch each other – otherwise they would appear to move
through each other. In the mechanical video, moving figures followed the laws of physics (e.g.,
figures bounced off each other and against the wall). Participants had to decide whether movements
performed by the geometrical figures were intentional, by pressing one of two response buttons (the
left or right arrow button of the keyboard). The stimuli of Riekki et al. (2014) were developed for
functional magnetic resonance imaging and therefore very easy to rate in terms of intentionality
and randomness. In order to increase the difficulty (and ambiguity), we cut the original 30-second
videos into three parts of 10 seconds. In addition, we increased the speed of the videos by decreasing
the length to 6 seconds per video, resulting in faster moving figures.
5.1.4. Procedure
The procedure was similar to the previous experiments. Participants were told that we were inves-
tigating howmusic and emotions influence perception. Participants had to judge whether or not geo-
metrical figures moved in an intentional manner by means of a keyboard press button (left =
intentional, right = not intentional, and vice versa for half of the participants as the instructions
were counterbalanced between-subjects). To explain to participants what it meant if figures were
moving intentionally, three practice videos were shown, one with figures moving in an intentional
fashion, one with figures moving in a mechanical fashion, and one with random moving figures.
If participants responded that they detected intentionality, they were subsequently asked to indicate
on a nine-point scale (1 = positive, 9 = negative) whether the valence of the intentionality was posi-
tive or negative. Thus, only when participants had indicated that they saw intentionality could they
rate the valence of the intentionality. In total, 36 clips were presented. Each participant saw each
video two times: one time in each condition (i.e., threat vs. control music). In each condition, the
order of the trials was randomized. Thus, in total, each participant assessed 72 videos, evenly divided
into 24 intentional, 24 random, and 24 mechanical videos. There was a 2-second inter-stimulus
interval between the assessment of the movements and the following video. Completing the Geo-
metrical Figures Task took around 20 minutes in total.
5.1.5. Data analysis
The analysis of the manipulation checks was similar to Experiments 1 and 2, although a one-way
ANOVA was added to check whether intentionality ratings were higher for the intentionality videos
than for the mechanical and random videos. The response bias (c) and the perceptual sensitivity (d’)
were calculated somewhat differently from the previous experiments. Similarly to the previous
experiments, perceiving intentionality in target trials resulted in hits, whereas not perceiving inten-
tionality in target trials resulted in misses. Unlike the previous experiments, there were no longer
three levels of noise trials (i.e., 48, 96, and 192 distractors), but two different types of random trials
(i.e., mechanical and random videos). So, perceiving intentionality in either mechanical or random
videos resulted in false alarms whereas not perceiving intentionality in these videos resulted in cor-
rect rejections. Thus, d’ and c were calculated based on the hit rate (i.e., proportion of intentional
videos in which intentionality was detected) and the false alarm rate (i.e., the proportion of both
mechanical and random videos in which intentionality was detected).
With regard to the valence of the intentionality ratings, these could not be analyzed by an RM-
ANOVA as a consequence of the procedure (i.e., participants filled out the intentionality rating only
if they had reported to perceive intentionality). Therefore, there was a large variability in the amount
of data points that could be analyzed per video for the intentionality ratings. That is to say, for inten-
tional and random videos, there were more data points than for mechanical videos. As the N in RM-
ANOVAs is based on the category with the least number of repetitions, we analyzed the data with
paired sample t-tests in which we contrasted the conditions (i.e., threat vs. control) per type of video
(intentional, mechanical, and random).
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5.2. Results
The mean religiosity of the participants in Experiment 3 was 1.4 (SD = 0.8; 1 = not religious at all, 7 =
very religious) and the average score on the RPBS was 2.0 (SD = 1.0; 1 = low paranormal belief score, 7
= high paranormal belief score), which are both low. None of the participants were excluded after
inspecting the button presses. Overall task performance during the Geometrical Figures Task was
76.9% correct, and the participants more often detected intentionality in the intentionality videos
(96.2%) than in the random (55.1%) and mechanical videos (10.3%), showing that the participants
understood the task. Reaction times did not differ significantly between the two conditions
(threat, M = 1060.1 ms, SD = 547.8 ms; control, M = 1077.7 ms, SD = 566.4 ms), t(36) = 0.27,
p = .785, d = 0.05, ω² < 0.01.
Analysis of the manipulation check questions indicated that participants found the threatening
music (M = 1.49, SD = 0.43) to be more strongly anxiety-provoking than the control music (M =
1.13, SD = 0.33; Wilcoxon’s t = 554, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.09, ω² = 0.26), although the anxiety levels
were still relatively low. In addition, participants perceived less control in the threat condition (M =
2.33, SD = 0.90) compared to the control condition (M = 2.70, SD = 0.84), Wilcoxon’s t = 32.5,
p < .001, d = 0.64, ω² = .07. Counterbalance order did not affect the response bias, F(1, 35) < 0.01,
MSE = 0.32, p = .970, d < 0.01, ω² < 0.01, or the perceptual sensitivity, F(1, 35) = 0.01, MSE = 1.10,
p = .908, d < 0.01, ω² < 0.01.
For the response bias (c), we did not find that participants had a higher response bias towards
detecting agents during the contextual threat manipulation than during the control condition,
F(1, 36) = 0.05, MSE = 0.03, p = .820, d = 0.02, ω² < 0.01 (see Figure 4, left graph). With regard to
the perceptual sensitivity, the threatening music manipulation affected the perceptual sensitivity,
F(1, 36) = 6.84, MSE = 0.09, p = .013, d = 0.85, ω² = 0.13 (see Figure 4, right graph). Participants
found it more difficult to judge whether the geometrical figures were moving intentionally or not
when the music was threatening than when the music was not threatening.
With regard to the valence ratings, participants viewing the intentionality videos rated the inten-
tional movements as more negative during the threat condition (M = 7.02, SD = 1.03) than during
the control condition (M = 6.56, SD = 1.07), Wilcoxon’s t = 499.50, p = .009, d = 0.48, ω² = 0.03.
During mechanical videos, participants rated the mechanical movements as similarly negative in
Figure 4. Response bias (left graph) and perceptual sensitivity (right graph) as a function of the type of condition (threat vs. con-
trol) in Experiment 3. The dark lines represent the difference between the threat condition (i.e., threatening music) and the control
condition (i.e., neutral music). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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the threat condition (M = 7.69, SD = 0.48) as in the control condition (M = 5.49, SD = 1.84), Wilcox-
on’s t = 10, p = .125, d = 1.74, ω² = 0.72, but note that the number of participants who perceived
intentionality and hence could fill out the scale was low (i.e., six in the control condition and
eight in the threat condition). During random videos, participants did not perceive more negative
intentionality in the threat condition (M = 7.34, SD = 1.15) than in the control condition (M =
7.03, SD = 1.53), Wilcoxon’s t = 86.50, p = .352, d = 0.25, ω² < 0.01.
5.3. Discussion
Similar to the previous experiments, we observed in Experiment 3 that a contextual music threat
manipulation did not increase the response bias of participants towards increased intentionality detec-
tion. However, in contrast to the previous experiments, the perceptual sensitivity was affected by the
manipulation; participants found itmore difficult to discriminate intentionality-present from intention-
ality-absent trials, during a threat manipulation. A possibility is that participants were generally dis-
tracted by the threatening music and found it more difficult to judge whether figures were moving
intentionally or not. A further interesting finding is that the Geometrical Figures Task was the first
dependent measure indicating that participants showed a general response bias towards perceiving
intentionality (i.e., a negative response bias [c]). These findings are in line with Lisdorf’s comments
(2007) suggesting that people aremore likely to have an intentionality detection bias than an agent detec-
tion bias. However, these results have to be interpreted with caution considering that the response bias
was close to zero.Moreover, this small response bias towardsdetecting intentionality didnot increase in a
mild threatening context when compared to a control context. This again seems to oppose the idea of a
“hypersensitive”device (e.g., Barrett, 2000),which supposedly evolvedon theprinciples of errormanage-
ment theory, favoring the least costly errors (Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Johnson et al., 2013).
Further, participants attributed more negative emotions towards the intentionality videos in the
threat condition, compared to the control condition. Thus, threatening music can affect the nature of
the interpretation of the intentions. However, the findings were not consistent: movements were only
perceived more negatively for intentional movements, but not for random and mechanical moving
figures, although for the latter, the power was too low to draw conclusions. A possibility as to why
intentional movements were perceived more negatively in the threat condition, but not for the other
types of videos, may be the result of the figures moving away from each other, which could have been
seen as a negative movement in both conditions.
One point of concern is the relatively small absolute difference between the anxiety ratings of the
threat and control condition in all previous experiments (max. 0.4 on a five-point scale). Possibly,
music presented in the lab induces modest feelings of anxiety, but it might not come close to the intense
feeling of threat of being alone in a dark forest. In the final experiment, we used a strong visual con-
textual prime (virtual reality) that reinforces feelings of threat throughout the experiment, similar to
the contextual music manipulation in Experiments 2 and 3, thereby boosting the ecological validity
of the study. Due to the fact that virtual reality is a visual contextual manipulation, we had to switch
to an auditory version of a human agent detection task (i.e., the Auditory Agent Detection Task). As a
result, however, we could also extend our research to the auditory system. The basic idea behind the
Auditory Agent Detection Task is similar to the Biological Motion Detection Task; participants were
required to detect human agent voices that are embedded within varying levels of white noise, and pure
white noise stimuli were also included to investigate to what extent participants falsely detect agents.
6. Experiment 4: horror virtual reality vs. control virtual reality
6.1. Methods
6.1.1. Participants
Thirty-one participants (20 female) were tested with a mean age of 24.8 years (SD = 7.3; range = 19–58).
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6.1.2. Experimental manipulation
In order to manipulate the feeling of anxiety, demo versions of two virtual reality scenarios were pre-
sented on the Oculus Rift development kit 2 (Oculus VR; Irvine, CA, USA). In the contextual threat
scenario “Teratophobia,”6 participants were walking around in a dark basement. Participants were
warned that the scenario was scary in order to elicit the anticipation of fear (and for ethical pur-
poses). In the control scenario “alien desert,”7 participants were able to walk around in a desert
environment and they were told that it would be a neutral scenario.
6.1.3. Experimental paradigm
The Auditory Agent Detection Task was based on the description of the Auditory Signal Detection
Task used by Barkus et al. (2007). Participants listened to 60 randomized trials of 3-second epochs of
white noise. In half of these, stimuli male agent voices were embedded pronouncing Dutch number
words (e.g., “one,” “ten”). These 1-second human voice fragments were recorded and normalized
regarding their pitch and dB-levels with Audacity (2.0.5, Boston, MA, USA). Subsequently, we fil-
tered the voices (low-pass filter 3400 Hz, high-pass filter 300 Hz). We varied both the position of
the voice within the white noise – after 1, 2, or 3 seconds – as well as the loudness percentage of
the noise – attenuated to 50%, 60%, or 70% of the original sound level. The white noise and voice
stimuli were combined in MatLab (R2013b, Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA). The stimuli were pre-
sented with over-ear headphones. In between stimuli was a variable interval of 1000–1500 ms.
6.1.4. Procedure
Participants were told that we were investigating the effects of virtual reality experiences on the audi-
tory system. Participants were instructed to listen to white noise fragments and that sometimes a
voice was embedded within the white noise. They were then told to press one of two buttons if
they heard a voice, and another if they did not. To gain high attention of the participants, it was
stressed that they had only 3 seconds after each stimulus to indicate whether they had detected
an agent voice or not. After 10 practice trials, the experimenter verified that the task was understood
and subsequently one of the virtual reality scenarios was started in a semi-random order (in such a
way that over the course of the entire study, all scenario orders were completely counterbalanced in
order to control for order effects). After completing each scenario, an anxiety questionnaire was filled
out. Upon completion, participants filled out the other questionnaires, and were debriefed about the
true purpose of the study.
6.1.5. Data analysis
Data were analyzed in the same way as in earlier experiments. The only difference was that the factor
noise level no longer consisted of 48, 96, and 192 distractors but of varying levels of the white noise
volume (50%, 60%, and 70%).
6.2. Results
The mean religiosity of the participants in Experiment 4 was 1.9 (SD = 1.5; 1 = not religious at all, 7 =
very religious) and the average score on the RPBS was 2.2 (SD = 1.0; 1 = low paranormal belief score,
7 = high paranormal belief score). Inspection of the button presses did not lead to exclusion of par-
ticipants. Overall task performance during the Auditory Agency Detection Task was 58.7% correct,
while four participants scored below chance level (i.e., less than 50% correct), indicating that the task
was more difficult, or perhaps participants were more distracted by the virtual reality manipulation
than in the previous tasks. Reaction times did not differ significantly between the two conditions
(threat, M = 942.9 ms, SD = 403.0 ms; control, M = 987.6 ms, SD = 358.8 ms), Wilcoxon’s t = 170,
p = .130, d = 0.16, ω² < 0.01. Participants reported higher levels of anxiety in the virtual reality threat
condition (M = 2.82, SD = 0.93) than in the virtual reality control condition (M = 1.80, SD = 0.54), t
(30) = 5.54, p < .001, d = 1.00, ω² = 0.48, while at the same time participants reported lower levels of
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control in the threat condition (M = 3.87, SD = 0.54) than in the control condition (M = 4.90, SD =
1.38), Wilcoxon’s t = 19, p < .001, d = 0.71, ω² = 0.32, both indicating that the manipulation provoked
the intended effect. Counterbalance order did not affect the response bias, F(1, 29) = 0.05, MSE =
1.04, p = .828, d = 0.09, ω² < 0.01, or the perceptual sensitivity, F(1, 29) = 0.03, MSE = 0.92, p
= .862, d < 0.01, ω² < 0.01.
Participants did not have a significantly higher response bias in the virtual reality threat condition
than in the control condition, F(1, 30) = 1.34, MSE = 0.32, p = .256, d = 0.42, ω² = 0.01 (see Figure 5,
left graph). We observed an effect of noise, F(2, 60) = 12.18, MSE = 0.06, p < .001, d = 1.28, ω² = 0.26,
suggesting that the response bias changed as a result of the level of white noise. Figure 5 (left graph)
indicates that the response bias increased with increments of the level of white noise. Thus, when the
level of white noise was higher, participants were more likely to perceive the trials to be absent of
agents. Finally, we did not observe an interaction effect, F(2, 60) = 0.39, MSE = 0.08, p = .677, d =
0.23, ω² < .01.
The threat manipulation did not affect the perceptual sensitivity, F(1, 30) = 1.78, MSE = 0.23, p
= .192, d = 0.49, ω² = 0.02, indicating that participants did not find it more difficult to discriminate
between agent-present and agent-absent trials as a result of the manipulation (see Figure 5, right
graph). We did find a main effect of noise, F(2, 60) = 20.01, MSE = 0.26, p < .001, d = 1.63, ω² =
0.38, indicating that perceptual sensitivity decreased as the level of white noise increased. Thus, par-
ticipants found it more difficult to judge whether an agent was present or not when the noise was
stronger. We did not observe an interaction between condition and noise level, F(2, 60) = 0.33,
MSE = 0.26, p = .722, d = 0.21, ω² < 0.01, indicating that the perceptual sensitivity as a function of
the level of white noise did not differ between the two conditions.
6.3. Discussion
In Experiment 4, we could not find an effect of a threatening contextual condition on the perceptual
sensitivity or the response bias: participants did not perceive more human voices when placed in a
threatening contextual situation, compared to a control situation. If anything, the effect was opposite
of what we had expected: participants perceived more agents in the desert environment than in the
Figure 5. The response bias (left graph) and perceptual sensitivity (right graph) as a function of the percentage of white noise in
Experiment 4. The dark lines represent the threat condition (i.e., threatening virtual reality scenario) and the light lines represent
the control condition (i.e., neutral virtual reality scenario). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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basement. An explanation could be that the desert elicited a feeling of loneliness, causing people to
perceive more human agency. For example, it has been suggested that due to people’s motivation to
stay socially connected, feelings of loneliness can cause people to actively search for sources of social
connection (Epley et al., 2008). Of all the experiments, the virtual reality manipulation of Experiment
4 resulted in the highest absolute anxiety score, which shows that manipulation of the experiment
was indeed stronger than in the previous experiments. In sum, Experiment 4 seems to present the
strongest case against the idea that threatening ambiguous situations lead to increased human
agent detection. In the following section, we conducted an explorative analysis in which we investi-
gated whether several concepts that have been theoretically related to supernatural beliefs (i.e., the
Anthropomorphization Scale, the Short Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, and the Negativity Bias
Scale) were associated with human agent or intentionality detection.
7. Explorative analysis
In the explorative analysis, we investigated whether the measures explained in Experiment 1b (i.e.,
religiosity, the RPBS, the Anthropomorphization Scale, the Short Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale,
and the Negativity Bias Scale) were associated with a response bias towards perceiving human agents
or intentionality. As agent and intentionality detection have been suggested to underlie supernatural
beliefs, we expected that religiosity and the RPBS would be correlated with a response bias towards
detecting agents (i.e., c < 0), implying an inverse relationship. Instead of taking these questionnaires
into account as covariates in each experiment, we grouped all experiments together in order to
increase the power to draw conclusions. Exploratively, we added three questionnaires (to Exper-
iments 1b, 2a, 3, and 4) that have been theoretically related to threat and agent detection in past
research, and we were interested to find out to what extent they correlated with agent detection.
First, the Anthropomorphization Scale (Waytz et al., 2010) was added to measure individual differ-
ences in the tendency to anthropomorphize. By doing so, we could investigate to what extent Guth-
rie’s anthropomorphization relates to biased agent detection. Furthermore, we expected higher
anthropomorphization scores to be related to stronger supernatural beliefs and agent detection.
Second, the Short Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Carleton et al., 2007) was added, which reflects
one’s difficulty in coping with ambiguous events. Thereby, we follow researchers who found that
increased intolerance of uncertainty could result in a tendency to perceive agency in random events
(Valdesolo & Graham, 2014a). We expected uncertainty scores to be positively related to agent detec-
tion. Third, the Negativity Bias Scale was added, which provides an indication of the ease with which
negative events capture attention compared to positive events (Fessler et al., 2014). This is in line
with the findings of Morewedge (2009), who observed during an ultimatum game8 that people
more often believed that other players were human agents rather than computers in cases where
the other players performed negative instead of positive actions. We expected that the negativity
bias would be positively related to agent or intentionality detection.
7.1. Data analysis
All experiments in which the questionnaires were added (i.e., 1b, 2a, 3, and 4) were taken into
account (N = 130). We calculated the average response bias (criterion c) of the three noise conditions
in order to have a measure for the agent and the intentionality detection task that was comparable
over experiments. An RM-ANCOVA was conducted, with condition as within-subjects factor and
experiment number as between-subjects factor. The five different measures (i.e., religiosity, RPBS,
the Anthropomorphization Scale, the Short Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, and the Negativity
Bias Scale) were taken into account as covariates. As the religiosity measure and the RPBS were
more positively skewed (skewness = 2.12 and 1.23 respectively) than the suggested cut-off score of
1 (Field, 2009), we performed a log natural (LN) transformation on the data before they were
added as covariates. After transformation, the skewness was 1.06 and 0.30 respectively. Although
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1.06 is slightly higher than 1, another LN transformation did not change the interpretation of the
results.
7.2. Results
Table 1 shows the within-subjects effects of the RM-ANCOVA (i.e., the interaction between con-
dition and the covariates) and Table 2 shows the outcomes of the between-subjects effects (i.e., exper-
iment and the covariates). None of the within-subjects effects were significant, indicating that over
the included experiments, condition did not have an influence on the response bias and condition
was also not systematically influenced by one of the covariates. With regard to the between-subjects
effects, the type of experiment, as well as the Negativity Bias Scale, were significant covariates of the
model. Thus, while holding the other variables constant, both the type of experiment and the Nega-
tivity Bias Scale were related to the response bias. An additional non-parametric Spearman rho cor-
relation (to account for deviations in normality) indicated that the direction of the Negativity Bias
Scale was in the predicted negative direction, implying that the response bias towards detecting
agents increased with a stronger negativity bias. To investigate whether the covariate was still signifi-
cant if the covariates were added independently, we conducted one additional RM-ANCOVA in
which we independently added the Negativity Bias Scale as a covariate. The between-subjects effect
of the Negativity Bias Scale remained significant, F(1, 126) = 4.10, MSE = 0.18, p = .045, d = 0.36, ω²
< 0.01. This additional analysis suggests that the negativity bias seems to have an independent
relationship with the response bias. Finally, the type of experiment had a large effect on the response
bias. This was mainly related to Experiment 3 (i.e., the geometrical figures experiment), in which the
average response bias was negative (i.e., implying a response bias towards perceiving agents) whereas
it was positive in the other experiments (i.e., implying a response bias towards perceiving absence of
agents).
Table 1. Within-subjects effects of the repeated measures analysis of covariance, with condition as within-subjects factor and
measures associated with agent detection as covariates, and the response bias (c) as repeatedly measured dependent variable.
SS df MS F p d ω²
C <0.01 1 <0.01 0.08 .779 0.06 <0.01
C*LN_Rel 0.02 1 0.02 0.55 .461 0.13 <0.01
C*LN_RPBS <0.01 1 <0.01 0.06 .807 <0.01 <0.01
C*NB 0.03 1 0.03 0.57 .452 0.14 <0.01
C*AS 0.03 1 0.03 0.69 .406 0.16 <0.01
C*IoU 0.02 1 0.02 0.47 .495 0.13 <0.01
C*Experiment 0.26 3 0.09 1.94 .127 0.44 0.01
Residual 5.32 121 0.04
Note: Type III Sum of Squares. C = Condition, LN_RPBS = natural log natural transformation of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale,
LN_Rel = log natural transformation of the religiosity measure, NB = Negativity Bias, A = Anthropomorphization Scale, IoU =
Intolerance of Uncertainty.
Table 2. Between-subjects effects of the repeated measures analysis of covariance, with experiment as between-subjects factor,
the measures associated with agent detection as covariates, and the response bias (c) as repeatedly measured dependent variable.
SS df MS F p d ω²
Intercept 0.56 1 0.56 3.13 .079 0.32 <0.01
LN_Rel 0.56 1 0.56 1.16 .078 0.32 <0.01
LN_RPBS 0.25 1 0.25 1.40 .239 0.21 <0.01
NB 1.21 1 1.21 6.79 .010 0.47 0.01
AS 0.64 1 0.64 3.57 .061 0.35 <0.01
IoU 0.47 1 0.47 2.65 .106 0.29 <0.01
Experiment 3.58 3 1.19 6.69 <.001 0.81 0.37
Residual 21.56 121 0.18
Note: Type III Sum of Squares. C = Condition, LN_RPBS = log natural transformation of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale, LN_Rel
= log natural transformation of the religiosity measure, NB = Negativity Bias, A = Anthropomorphization Scale, IoU = Intolerance
of Uncertainty.
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7.3. Discussion
This explorative analysis revealed that, over the four experiments in which we included the question-
naires (i.e., religiosity, RPBS, the Anthropomorphization Scale, the Short Intolerance of Uncertainty
Scale, and the Negativity Bias Scale), supernatural beliefs (i.e., religiosity and the RPBS) were not
related to increased agent detection, whereas the Negativity Bias Scale was related to increased
agent detection. With regard to supernatural beliefs, these findings appear to be in contrast with
the theoretical suggestions of authors who reasoned that a bias towards agent detection may underlie
supernatural beliefs (e.g., Barrett, 2000, 2008, 2012). Other previous attempts to investigate whether a
bias to detect agents have resulted in mixed findings (for a critical discussion, see van Elk et al., 2016).
In the general discussion, we elaborate on the causes that may explain why we failed to find a
relationship between supernatural beliefs and agent detection, for example the relative lack of super-
natural beliefs in our samples.
Interestingly, the negativity bias was related to increased agent detection. In line with earlier find-
ings (e.g., Hamlin, Baron, & Young, 2014; Morewedge, 2009), this suggests that people who have a
bias to interpret events as if they are negative more often interpret ambiguous situations as if they are
(caused by) agents. In other correlational studies, anxiety (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2007) and uncertainty
(van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013) had already been linked to supernatural beliefs. However, this effect
was not intensified in the threatening conditions. Thus, it may be that particularly anxiety-prone
individuals try to compensate for their anxious feeling by applying false models to the world in
order to perceive it in a more structured fashion (e.g., Landau, Kay, & Whitson, 2015). In addition,
these findings again highlight the importance of individual differences when investigating agent
detection (Barnes & Gibson, 2013).
Finally, with regard to the finding that the response bias differed in Experiment 3 from the other
experiments, this is likely the result of the different means by which agent detection was operatio-
nalized. Compared to Experiments 1, 2, and 4, Experiment 3 differed because the dependent variable
(i.e., the Geometrical Figures Task) was an operationalization of intentionality detection, whereas
human agent detection was measured in the other experiments.
8. General discussion
The observed data are generally not in line with the notion that threatening conditions lead to a bias
to detect human agents or intentionality in ambiguous situations compared to control conditions.
Furthermore, in all experiments in which the dependent variable was operationalized in terms of
human agent detection (Experiments 1, 2, and 4), participants had a bias towards responding that
human agents were absent. This tendency to judge human agents as being absent decreased with
increasing ambiguity of trials (i.e., with increments of noise). Only when the dependent variable
was operationalized in terms of intentionality detection (Experiment 3) did participants show a
small response bias towards perceiving intentionality, albeit close to zero. Further, by means of an
explorative analysis, it was observed that individual differences on the negativity bias were related
to agency detection. Below, we will discuss these findings in more detail. First, we argue that the
data could still be compatible with HADD reasoning. Second, we discuss several concerns that
may have prevented us from finding an increased response bias as a result of the threat manipula-
tions. Third, we discuss the questionnaires in relation to agency detection. Finally, we discuss rec-
ommendations for future research.
At first sight, our findings may appear to diverge from HADD reasoning (e.g., Barrett, 2000).
However, in all experiments, participants falsely detected agents in ambiguous stimuli such as
point-lights, geometrical figures, and white noise. Over all the experiments, this was the case in
26.1% of all the noise trials (i.e., half of all trials in which no agent was included). In addition, par-
ticipants often perceived intentionality in moving geometrical figures, even if these were moving ran-
domly. These observations converge with the findings of numerous other researchers (e.g., Gosselin
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& Schyns, 2003; Liu et al., 2014; Nees & Phillips, 2015; Scholl & Gao, 2013; van Elk, 2013; van Elk
et al., 2016): People often perceive false agents and intentionality on the basis of ambiguous infor-
mation. Thus, the data are still in support of the idea that humans easily detect human agents
and intentionality in ambiguous information.
However, the data do seem to diverge from HADD reasoning in two respects. Firstly, apart from
Experiment 3, participants consistently had a response bias towards detecting the absence of agents.
Therefore, the term “hypersensitive” agency detection device seems a bit misplaced. Secondly, mild
to moderate feelings of threat did not change the response bias towards perceiving agents. Similarly,
Hoskin et al. (2014) found stressful pictures to be unrelated to false alarms on a Speech Detection
Task, a paradigm comparable to our Auditory Agent Detection Task. These observations appear
to be in contrast with the predictions derived from error management theory (Haselton & Nettle,
2006; Johnson et al., 2013). Nevertheless, we raise several concerns for why we may have failed to
find a threat-dependent agent detection bias in the presented experiments.
A first concern is that the threat manipulations used were not close enough to real-life threatening
situations, leading to an insufficient level of threat elicited (i.e., a problem with ecological validity).
On the one hand, comparable forms of threat manipulations used in Experiments 1 to 3 have been
successfully used in a range of studies as a means of inducing a feeling of fear or threat in which
cognitive processing was the dependent variable (e.g., Koster et al., 2004; Mogg et al., 2004; Schim-
mack & Derryberry, 2005; Van Damme et al., 2008; Yiend &Mathews, 2001). In the experiment with
the highest anxiety ratings (i.e., the virtual reality experiment), the effects also did not support the
idea that threat increases human agent detection. On the other hand, it may well be possible that
at higher threat levels illusory agent detection is increased. Our study indicates, at the very least,
that the term “hypersensitive” seems inadequate. Specifically, it would follow logically from a hyper-
sensitive agent detection device that participants would jump to agent detection as a result of a small
boost in anxiety. This was not observed in the present series of studies.
A second concern is the way in which agent and intentionality detection were operationalized.
First, there was no intrinsic or direct relation between the threat manipulations (i.e., fearful pictures)
and the dependent measures (i.e., biological motion stimuli). This may have decreased the likelihood
that the threatening context generalized to the agent or intentionality detection paradigm. An advan-
tage of the used tasks is that they yield clear signal detection-based estimates of the response bias and
the perceptual sensitivity. At the same time, the signal detection stimuli were not intrinsically threa-
tening at all. Perhaps, if cues of agents would have been immersed more strongly with the virtual
reality scenario, like breaking branches within a threatening dark forest, this may have resulted in
an increased false agent detection rate, compared to a non-threatening forest in daylight. Unfortu-
nately, we were dependent on available virtual reality scenarios so such an experiment was not feas-
ible, but it may be worthwhile for future researchers to use a more integrative approach to
manipulate and assess agent detection. Secondly, it could be argued that the paradigms were not
reflecting the detection of agents, but rather the detection of biological motion. This is indeed a con-
cern for the first three experiments, but this argument does not hold for the virtual reality exper-
iment, in which a real human agent voice was embedded within white noise. Again, it is
problematic that this voice was relatively independent from the threat manipulation. In future
studies, researchers could manipulate the emotional content of the dependent measures (e.g., by
embedding a threatening voice in the auditory noise stimuli). Future researchers could also try to
focus more on positive rewards, instead of threat. For example, it may be evolutionarily advan-
tageous to detect agents when seeking help, or when looking for prey to eat.
A third concern is that the principles underlying error management theory do not fully apply to
our experiments. For example, the theory predicts a bias towards the least costly error when there is
an imbalance in the costs between both errors. On the one hand, it could be argued that none of the
threats utilized in the present experiments posed an ecologically valid potential threat to participants.
In follow-up studies, researchers could increase the imbalance of the potential costs and benefits of
the errors, for example by reducing the incentives for false negatives. Nevertheless, it could also be
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argued that only in the absence of an imbalance of error costs the error management theory can be
tested to be sure that the bias is implicit (McKay, personal communication). If the payoffs are asym-
metric, then all people should show this bias purely on the basis of expected utility theory.
A final concern is that all conditions included markers indicative of human agents, as all stimuli
were the product of intentional humans. This on its own may explain the null findings observed. We
agree that all man-made products reveal markers of agents, but we do want to stress that on a per-
ceptual level, and within the context of the experimental paradigm, agency was objectively absent in
the control conditions. Furthermore, the fact that increasing the ambiguity of the tasks (i.e., increases
in distractors/noise) resulted in lower d prime values suggests that the participants were able to dis-
criminate the presence of agents vs. the absence of agents within the well-defined context of the
experimental task and paradigm that we used. Thus, it is unlikely that our observations were the
result of participants over-detecting agency in the control conditions. Nevertheless, in future studies,
researchers would benefit from trying to disentangle further the concepts of agents, agency, and
intentionality, in relation to humanness.
With regard to the questionnaires, it is interesting that the supernatural belief scales (i.e., religi-
osity and the RPBS) were not significantly related to the response bias. However, this observation
should be interpreted with caution, as an important limitation of our study is that the samples con-
sisted of people scoring low on supernatural beliefs. Furthermore, it may be argued that scholars such
as Guthrie and Barrett were not trying to account for individual variability in religiosity. On the other
hand, an experimental psychological approach towards investigating the relationship between
agency detection and supernatural beliefs has been proposed by Barrett and Burdett (Barrett & Bur-
dett, 2011) and others (e.g., McKay &Whitehouse, 2015). Further, in previous studies from our lab, a
relationship between supernatural beliefs and agency detection had been observed with comparable
designs (e.g., van Elk, 2013; van Elk et al., 2016). Interestingly, the Negativity Bias Scale was related to
increased agent detection. In the discussion of the explorative analysis, it has already been explained
that this is consistent with previous work by others (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2007; Hamlin et al., 2014;
Morewedge, 2009; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013). More generally, this individual difference
measure is likely to have an effect on agent detection by influencing the expectations of people.
Thus, future studies may shift the focus towards investigating individual differences (Barnes & Gib-
son, 2013), and more specifically, the expectations that people have when it comes to agency detec-
tion. For example, some people may expect there to be dangerous agents in the forest due to the
movies they have watched, whereas other people who cycle through a dark forest every day may
not expect dangerous agents at all. These individual differences should be taken into account
when conducting studies on agent detection.
In conclusion, our study confirms previous research that people occasionally detect agents in
ambiguous stimuli (in line with HADD reasoning). This study nuances the idea that we have a
“bias” towards agent detection (in contrast to HADD reasoning), as people generally did not detect
agents and because mild to moderate threatening situations never intensified agent detection. Thus,
the term “hypersensitive” seems unwarranted. Moreover, the observations in the present study high-
light the importance of further experimental investigation of the HADD and error management the-
ory. Admittedly, our conclusions are preliminary, as we have outlined several concerns that may
have prevented us from finding an effect of threat on the response bias. Summing up, this study con-
tributes to the HADD literature by providing clear instructions for future research (in terms of the
individual differences that should be taken into account and by providing recommendations for the
design) and by revealing the boundary conditions under which agent and intentionality detection are
not intensified.
Notes
1. For the purpose of this article, we are specifically interested in the belief in supernatural agents, i.e., human-like
entities, that are often invisible and that can exert a causal influence on our world. We note that our definition
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of supernatural beliefs hinges strongly on an ethnocentric andWestern conception of the supernatural – a focus
that has also been prevalent in the cognitive science of religion literature (see, for instance, Norenzayan’s Big
Gods, 2013). This does not preclude the notion that other non-ethnocentric definitions of the supernatural may
be useful to distinguish as well (see, for instance, Horton, 1993), but our focus is primarily on the evolutionary
psychological claim that agency detection biases play a causal role in shaping belief in supernatural entities.
2. The hypothesized relation between the HADD and supernatural beliefs has been discussed elsewhere (van Elk
et al., 2016) and is not the topic of the present study.
3. For explorative purposes, we added three questionnaires to the experiments (except for Experiments 1a and 2b
as the chronological order of the experiments in the article differs from the order in which the experiments were
conducted): the Anthropomorphization Scale (Waytz et al., 2010), the Short Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale
(Carleton et al., 2007) and the Negativity Bias Scale (Fessler et al., 2014). The details are explained in Exper-
iment 1 and the explorative analyses.
4. www.pointlightlab.com.
5. We anticipated that some participants would need to be excluded and therefore collected somewhat more data
than the desired 30 participants.
6. https://share.oculus.com/app/teratophobia.
7. https://share.oculus.com/app/alien-desert.
8. An ultimatum game is an economic decision game in which one player needs to divide money with a second
player, who in its turn can either accept or reject the proposal. As a result, the money is split or neither player
receives anything.
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